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If insurers cannot charge risk-differentiated premiums, then:
higher risks buy more insurance, lower risks buy less insurance,
raising the pooled price of insurance,
lowering the demand for insurance,
usually portrayed as a bad outcome, both for insurers and for society.
In practice:
Policymakers often see merit in restricting insurance risk classification
EU ban on using gender in insurance underwriting.
Moratoria on the use of genetic test results in underwriting.
Question:
How can we reconcile theory with practice?
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Introduction Motivating example
Motivation: Two risk-groups µL = 0.01 and µH = 0.04
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Insurance demand Why do people buy insurance?
Why do people buy insurance?
Assumptions
Consider an individual with
an initial wealth W,
exposed to the risk of loss L,
with probability µ,
utility of wealth u(w), with u′(w) > 0, and
an opportunity to insure at premium rate pi.
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Insurance demand Utility of wealth and insurance purchasing decision
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Insurance demand Utility of wealth and insurance purchasing decision
Heterogeneity
Simplest model:
If everybody has exactly the same W, L, µ and u(·), then:
All will buy insurance if pi < pic.
None will buy insurance if pi > pic.
Reality: Not all will buy insurance even at fair premium.
Heterogeneity:
Even if individuals are homogeneous in terms of underlying risk,
they can still be heterogeneous in terms of risk-aversion which is
unobservable by insurers.
Source of randomness from insurers’ perspective:
Utility of insurance of an individual chosen at random, u(W − pi L), is a
random variable, UI .
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Insurance demand Demand for insurance
Demand for insurance
Standardisation
As certainty equivalent is invariant to positive affine transformations, we
assume u(W) = 1 and u(W − L) = 0 for all individuals.
Insurance purchasing decision:
Given a premium pi, an individual will purchase insurance if:
u(W − pi L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Utility with insurance
> (1− µ) u(W) + µ u(W − L) = (1− µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Utility without insurance
.
Demand as a function of premium:
Given a premium pi, insurance demand, d(pi), is:
d(pi) = P [UI > 1− µ] .
P Tapadar (University of Kent) Can adverse selection increase social welfare? February, 2020 8 / 26














P Tapadar (University of Kent) Can adverse selection increase social welfare? February, 2020 9 / 26
Insurance demand Demand for insurance
Demand for insurance
Small premium assumption
For small premium amounts pi L (compared to initial wealth W), the utility functions
over (W − pi L,W) can be approximated by a straight line, i.e.:
u(W − pi L) ≈ u(W)− pi L u′(W) = 1− pi L u′(W) = 1− pi γ,
where γ = L u′(W) can be interpreted as a risk preferences index.
Insurance purchasing decision:
Under this assumption, an individual will purchase insurance if:
u(W − pi L) > (1− µ)⇔ 1− pi γ > 1− µ⇔ γ < µ
pi
.
Demand as a function of premium:
Given a premium pi, insurance demand, d(pi), is:







Note: Insurers cannot observe individual γ, so Γ is a random variable.
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Insurance demand Example: Iso-elastic demand
Example: Iso-elastic demand
Constant demand elasticity





, (subject to a cap of 1)
then elasticity of demand is a constant:










FΓ(γ) = P [Γ ≤ γ] =

0 if γ < 0
τ γλ if 0 ≤ γ ≤ (1/τ)1/λ
1 if γ > (1/τ)1/λ.
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Insurance demand Example: Iso-elastic demand
Example: Iso-elastic demand
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Insurance market Insurance risk classification
Insurance risk classification
Risk-groups
Suppose a population can be divided into 2 risk-groups where:
risk of losses: µ1 < µ2;
population proportions: p1, p2;





, i = 1, 2;
fair-premium demand: τi = di(µi) for i = 1, 2;
premiums offered: pi1, pi2.
Note: The framework can be generalised for n > 2 risk-groups.
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Insurance market Market equilibrium
Market equilibrium
For a randomly chosen individual, define:
Q = I [ Individual is insured ] ;
X = I [ Individual incurs a loss ] ;
Π = Premium offered to the individual.
Simplifying assumption
The potential loss amount L is same for all individuals.
Expected premium, claim and market equilibrium
Market equilibrium: E[QΠ] = E[QX], where,
Expected premium: E[QΠ] = p1 d1(pi1) pi1 + p2 d2(pi2) pi2,
Expected claim: E[QX] = p1 d1(pi1) µ1 + p2 d2(pi2) µ2.
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Insurance market Risk-classification regimes
Risk-classification regimes
Risk-differentiated premiums: pi = (µ1, µ2)
Equilibrium is achieved when pi1 = µ1 and pi2 = µ2.
No losses for insurers.
No (actuarial/economic) adverse selection.
Pooled premium: pi = (pi0, pi0)
If risk-classification is banned, insurers charge same premium pi0 to both risk-groups.
Market equilibrium⇒ No losses for insurers! ⇒ No (actuarial) adverse
selection.
Pooled premium is greater than average premium charged under full risk
classification⇒ (Economic) adverse selection.
Aggregate demand (cover) is lower than under full risk classification⇒
(Economic) adverse selection.












For any premium regime pi, social welfare is the expected utility for an individual









= E [QUI + (1− Q) (1− X)] , using UW = 1 and UW−L = 0.
Social welfare under iso-elastic demand












where constant K does not depend on the premium regime under consideration.
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Social welfare Iso-elastic demand with same demand elasticity
Iso-elastic demand with same demand elasticity
λ







λ < 1⇔ S(pi0) > S(µ)⇒ Risk pooling is better than full risk classification.
λ > 1⇔ S(pi0) < S(µ)⇒ Risk pooling is worse than full risk classification.
Empirical evidence suggests λ < 1 in many insurance markets.
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Social welfare Iso-elastic demand with different demand elasticities















everywhere to left of boundary curve
S(pi0) < S(µ)
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Social welfare Iso-elastic demand with different demand elasticities
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λ1 ≤ 1 and λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ 1
λ1
⇒ S(pi0) ≥ S(µ).
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Social welfare Iso-elastic demand with different demand elasticities
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λ 2 S(pi0) ≥ S(µ)guaranteed in green shaded area
for all population structures
S(pi0) ≥ S(µ)




∃ pi∗ 3 λ1 ≤ 1 and λ2 > 1
λ1
and pi0 ≥ pi∗ ⇒ S(pi0) ≥ S(µ).
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Social welfare Generalisations
Generalisations
The results can be generalised:
For any number of risk-groups n ≥ 2.
For full take-up of insurance by the high risk-group.
For general insurance demand function using arc elasticity of demand.
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Conclusions
Conclusions
Adverse selection need not always be adverse.
Restricting risk classification increases social welfare if:
λ ≤ 1, when demand elasticity is the same for all risk-groups.
λ1 ≤ 1 and λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ 1, when demand elasticities are different.
Empirical evidence suggests λ < 1 in many insurance markets.
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